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Abstract
Within the next couple of months, the Greek government, is supposed to persuade
private creditors holding about EUR 200bn in its bonds to voluntarily exchange their
existing bonds for new bonds that pay roughly 50 percent less. This may work with
large creditors whose failure to participate in a debt exchange could trigger a Greek
default, but may not persuade smaller creditors, who will be told that their claims will
continue to be fully serviced if they do not participate in the exchange. This paper
proposes an approach to dealing with this free rider problem that exploits the fact that
with some probability, the proposed exchange might be followed by an involuntary
restructuring some time in the future. The idea is to design the new bonds that
creditors are offered in the exchange in a way that make them much harder to
restructure than the current Greek government bonds. This is easy to do because the
vast majority of outstanding Greek government bonds lack standard creditor
protections. Hence, creditors would be offered a bond that performs much worse than
their current bond if things go according to plan, but much better if things do not.
They will accept this instrument if (1) the risk of a new Greek debt restructuring in the
medium term is sufficiently high; and (2) there is an expectation that the next
restructuring probably will not be voluntary.
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Introduction
According to an understanding reached at the summit of European heads of
government on October 26, 2011, the Greek government, within the next few months
will attempt to persuade private creditors holding about EUR 200bn in its bonds to
voluntarily take a 50 percent reduction of the face value of their bonds. In a
hypothetical scenario where all of the Greek bonds were held by a handful of big
creditors, they could likely be persuaded to take the haircut. The argument would be
that the failure to grant Greece relief would worsen its financial condition and
eventually result in political chaos and default. Under those conditions, creditors
would be lucky to get anything close to 50 percent. Arguments to that effect were
made, often effectively, to persuade the holders of syndicated loans to Latin American
sovereign debtors in the 1980s to voluntarily take significant reductions in their
holdings.
However, according to calculations by J.P. Morgan, only about EUR 120 bn of
Greek government bonds are held by large institutional investors such as banks,
pension funds, and insurance companies. This leaves up to EUR 80bn in the hands of
asset managers, sovereign wealth funds, and some retail investors. For the most part,
these holders are seeking to maximize returns and have no desire to build reputations
as co-operators with the Eurozone governments. The fact that roughly EUR 120 bn
worth of bonds will be tendered by the big regulated holders means that Greece will
come out of the exchange with a reduced debt load and will be better able to pay its
creditors. Under those conditions, the question for the non-institutional investors is:
Why tender, especially if the exchange is voluntary in the sense that Greece is
expected to continue its debt service to non-tendering creditors after the exchange?
Adding to the complications is that the border between the categories of a
large regulated holder and holdouts is porous. The large holders, once it becomes
clear that the primary pressures to take the 50 percent cut are going to be their size
and identities, will have an incentive to engage in arbitrage. The result will be that
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more and more bonds will end up in the hands of those who can extract the highest
value from engaging in a holdout strategy. This is particularly true since the
regulators in question (the ones who are supposed to apply the pressure on these
institutions to take the 50 percent haircut) have conflicting incentives. While they
want these institutions to tender in the exchange, they also have an interest in the
institutions being as financially strong as possible. If selling on the open market to a
hedge fund will yield a higher value, then there will be a temptation to allow at least
the weakest of these institutions to sell.
On the face of it, the proposal to do the Greek exchange on a voluntary basis
seems to run into a devastating free rider problem. Free rider problems are not new in
the context of debt exchanges – all bond exchanges since the Brady deals have had to
deal with this problem in some form.2 However, the great majority of these exchanges
addressed the problem by maintaining some ambiguity as to whether nonparticipating creditors would in fact be repaid – that is, the exchanges were conducted
under the threat of default.3 This approach has so far been ruled out for Greece. And,
as of this writing, policy makers also appear reluctant to utilize any legal approach
that involves a change in the payment terms of the bonds against the will of dissenting
bondholders. In particular, this reduces the possibility of dealing with the free rider
problem by “retrofitting” a collective action clause on the Greek bonds, which could
be achieved through domestic Greek law.4
This paper addresses the question of whether it is conceptually and legally
possible to design the Greek debt exchange in a way that (i) is voluntary in the sense
that the government promises to continue servicing its debt to creditors regardless of
whether they accept the debt exchange offer or not; (ii) achieves a 50 percent
“haircut” of the Greek debt and (iii) eliminates the free rider problem. The answer,
after a lot of brain-racking, is a qualified Yes. We proceed in two stages.


We begin by asking what incentives a potential holdout might possibly have to
accept a 50 percent haircut from a government that is at the same time
reassuring him or her that it will continue honoring its debts in full even if the
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creditor prefers to hold on to its old bonds. Indeed, a holder of Greek debt that
matures soon is unlikely to have any such incentive. But a bondholder whose
amortisation is still several years off might well have. The reason, ironically,
is the possibility that even a 50 percent haircut of Greece’s privately held debt
might not be enough to restore Greece to solvency. That is, with some
probability, even a successful Greek debt exchange may be followed by an
additional debt restructuring operation after a few years. If this probability is
viewed as sufficiently high, and holders of the new Greek government debt
offered in the exchange can expect to survive that second restructuring in
much better shape than the holders of the old debt, this would remove the
incentive to free ride.
Next, we ask whether there are ways in which the Greek government can
design the new debt instruments to make them much more “restructuring
proof” than the existing debt instruments. The answer turns out to be Yes, in
part because the existing instruments offer virtually no creditor protection. We
explore two approaches. The first is to legally subordinate the old instruments
to the new ones – meaning that in the event of a new debt restructuring, the
old instruments would be repaid only after the new instruments have been
repaid in full. The problem with this approach is that it will constitute a default
event under the terms of a standard sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS)
contract, which European policy makers have so far tried to avoid. The second
approach is to subordinate the old instruments de facto but not de jure, by
making the new instruments more difficult to restructure. This latter option
would probably not trigger CDS contracts.

In the section that follows, we first present a characterisation of the standard
free rider problem in debt exchanges. We describe the way in which this is typically
solved, the complications added by the requirement of voluntary participation, and
whether and how these complications can be addressed in principle. We then go on to
describe two legal strategies through which this solution could be implemented.
Finally, we present some back-of-the-envelope calculations to establish whether the
approach discussed might in fact be sufficient to dissuade free riders. The conditions
under which this would be the case turn out to be stringent, but could be met,
provided that investors expect any additional restructuring to be involuntary. The
latter is plausible, if the current strategy to restore Greece to solvency falters in the
near term. Without new Greek borrowing from the private markets, the fraction of
official sector debt in the Greek debt stock will likely continue to increase in the near
term. Assuming that the official creditors remain unwilling to take a haircut, the
private sector haircut required to restore solvency the next time around will be that
much higher.

A Framework for Thinking About Incentives to Free Ride
A typical debt pre-default exchange offer – that is, one which does not
necessarily insist on “voluntariness” in the sense defined in the introduction – tries to
persuade creditors to tender using a version of the argument that a bird in hand is
preferable to two in the bush. That is, the offer is designed to create a risk-return
tradeoff. The new bond offered will typically be lower in net present value than the
old bond if both are discounted at the same rate. However, accepting the new bond is
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safer than holding on to the old bond, because there is ambiguity about whether the
old bond will in fact be honored. As a result, the creditor that is trying to decide
whether to accept the offer may find that the value of the new bond exceeds the
expected value of the old bond.
Figure 1 illustrates this simple decision problem from the perspective of a
creditor who is small enough to free ride. If the creditor accepts the exchange offer,
she receives a payoff 1-h per unit of the old bond tendered with probability 1, where h
denotes the haircut suffered by tendering investors. If she rejects the offer, she will be
repaid in full with some probability, denoted p.5 With probability 1-p, the debtor
defaults, in which case the creditor receives some (low) recovery value vO < 1-h. The
creditor accepts if 1-h ≥ p+(1-p) vO. That is, for a given haircut, the creditor accepts
the offer if the probability of receiving full repayment on the old bonds is sufficiently
low.
Figure 1.
t=1: payoff 1-h
Accept

t=0

p

Reject

payoff 1

t=1
1-p

payoff 0 ≤ vO < 1

Now, suppose that the debtor insists that the exchange is “voluntary” in the
sense defined in the introduction, that is, it promises to service the debt of any holdout
in full. Assume that this removes any ambiguity about whether the old debt will be
repaid. In Figure 1, this would mean that p = 1. The implication is that for any h > 0,
the exchange offer would always be rejected: clearly, a safe payment of 1 is
preferable to a safe payment of 1-h. Hence, if this is the right characterisation of the
decision problem, then a “voluntary” haircut is inconsistent with a positive haircut.
Making the offer “voluntary” removes any risk-return trade off. Rather than
comparing a bird in hand with two in the bush, the creditor is faced with the choice of
one bird in hand versus two birds in hand, and will always opt for the latter.
However, Figure 1 embodies an assumption that makes it potentially
misleading. The assumption is that participating creditors face no sovereign risk after
having accepted the haircut h. In a case like Greece, which is unlikely to go back to its
pre-crisis credit rating immediately even after a successful debt exchange involving a
large haircut, this is surely too strong. Figure 2 describes the creditor decision
5
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problem after this assumption is dropped, where 1-π denotes the sovereign risk
associated with the new bonds, and vN the recovery value of the new bonds in the
event of default. The decision rule for accepting the offer becomes:
π(1-h)+(1- π )vN ≥ p+(1-p) vO.
Hence, the creditor’s decision will be influenced by the default risk and the
recovery value of the new bonds as well as by the default risk and recovery value
associated with the old bonds.

Figure 2.
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The question is now what “voluntariness” of an exchange offer means in the
framework described by Figure 2. The answer to this turns out to hinge on the
maturity the old debt held by the prospective holdout creditor.




if the old debt is short term, in the sense that it comes due immediately
or very soon after the debt exchange, then p = 1 arguably remains the
right characterization of “voluntariness” from the perspective of a
small creditor. That is, the sovereign promises to repay holdouts and
does so, because the debt is in fact due more or less at the time of the
promise.
if, however, the old debt is medium or long term, then it is subject to
some default risk – just like the new debt. At most, the debtor can
promise that the default risk faced by the hold out will be as low as the
default risk faced by the creditor that accepts the offer: p = π.

6

In the case of Greece, just over EUR 34 bn of bond amortizations fall due in
2012, out of the approximately EUR 257 bn due from end-2011 onward. This implies
that most debtors are in the second camp.6
We now return to the title question of the paper: can a debt exchange offer be
both voluntary and involve a haircut? The answer is No if the old debt is short term,
but Yes in principle if it is not. Using p = π, the decision rule for accepting the debt
exchange offer becomes:
π ≤ (vN – vO) / (vN - vO + h)
That is, for a given h > 0, a holder of medium or long term sovereign bonds
might accept a debt exchange offer if:



the probability of full repayment π is sufficiently low, and
the recovery value associated with the new bonds, vN , is sufficiently
high relative to the recovery value associated with the old bonds.

To summarize: except for holders of very short term debt, the promise to
continue servicing the old debts along with new bonds with lower debt service does
not necessarily make holding out a dominant strategy, because there may be a state of
the world where the new bonds perform better than the old bonds. As long as there is
no default, the creditor is obviously better off by holding on to the old bonds. But if
the new bonds have higher value in the event of a default or involuntary restructuring,
and if the probability of such a restructuring is sufficiently likely, this will make the
new bonds the “safer” option, and possibly more attractive than the old debt.
The question, discussed in the next section, is what the debtor can do to ensure
that the new bonds are, in fact, ”safer” in this sense.

Legal Techniques to Maximise Participation in a Voluntary Debt Exchange
The techniques discussed in this section exploit the fact that the vast majority
of outstanding Greek bonds are domestically issued instruments that do not contain
standard creditor protection clauses such as a “pari passu” clause prohibiting legal
subordination, a “negative pledge clause” prohibiting the issuance of new
collateralised debt unless existing debt is enhanced in the same way, and a crossdefault clause that defines a default on another government bond as a default event.7
This is typical for the majority of the debt Eurozone countries issued after the
adoption of the common currency, albeit with some variations across countries (Table
1). As a result, it is relatively straightforward for the Greek sovereign to adopt
measures that would put creditors in a better position to recover value in a future
default if they choose to part with their existing instruments.
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Table 1. Characteristics of Local-Law Government Bonds of Selected
Eurozone Countries
Country
Ireland
Belgium
Greece
Spain
Portugal
Italy

Local
Law
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Acceleration

Modification

No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No

Cross
Default
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Negative
Pledge
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Pari
Passu
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: The essential terms of the contracts were obtained from offering documents available on
Thomson One Banker and Dealogic.

Technique One: Legal Subordination
Pari passu clauses assure lenders that they will rank equally with the holders
of all other unsubordinated debt. This means that the sovereign debtor cannot take
actions that have the effect of legally subordinating the holder of the bond that has a
pari passu clause. An example of such a subordination would be the sovereign
passing a law saying that it will pay one set of creditors ahead of another set. In order
to incentivize creditors to enter into its exchange offer in 2005, Argentina attempted
to do something along these lines. First, it announced in its exchange offer that it
planned to service only the new bonds tendered in the exchange i.e. that it had no
plans to resume debt service on any of the old bonds (which had been in default since
the end of 2001). Second, it passed a law (the “Padlock law”) that constrained it from
negotiating a new deal with the bondholders who had not entered into the exchange.
Arguably, the holdouts had been legally subordinated.8
Ordinarily, sovereigns cannot take such actions because they have agreed to
pari passu clauses in all of their bonds. Since the vast majority of Greek bonds,
however, lack pari passu clauses, Greece can pass a law saying that the bondholders
who exchange their bonds for the 50 percent haircut will have priority, in terms of
getting paid first out of tax revenues, over the holders of Greek government bonds
without pari passu clauses who do not tender. Such a law would be consistent with the
contractual terms of Greek government bonds.
Furthermore, legal subordination of this type may be consistent even with the
spirit of a voluntary debt exchange. This is because (unlike the case of Argentina) the
old bonds would continue be serviced as long as all goes according to plan – that is,
holdouts would continue to get paid following the debt exchange. Indeed, if the
combination of a debt exchange, fiscal adjustment and growth restore the
sustainability of Greek debt, the old bondholders would get repaid in full. But the law
could specify that in the event of a new debt restructuring, this would first affect the
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holders of the old bonds, and could only begin to affect the holders of the new debt if
the old debt is written down to zero.
Complications
There is a question of whether subordination stipulated by domestic law, along
the lines described above, would be credible. From the perspective of
committing a sovereign, domestic law is not a strong device. It could simply
be changed in the future, lifting the requirement of legal subordination
(although it is not clear why the government would want to do that). Hence,
subordination is ultimately based on a government promise. The question is
whether creditors would find this promise from the Greek government to be
sufficiently credible such that few or no holders will be tempted to hold out.
One argument might be that domestic political economy may generally work
in favour of keeping such promises -- why treat a particular class of creditors
better ex post if you have already told them and your voters that they will be
subordinated?
Second, legal subordination would trigger CDS contracts. One of the triggers
in the standard sovereign CDS is an act of subordination (which we take to
mean legal subordination). We do not take a position in this paper as to
whether avoiding triggering CDS payouts is a good public policy objective or
not – arguments can be made both ways.9 However, it seems clear that the
desire to avoid triggering of CDS contracts is one of the main motivations
what European policy have been insisting on “voluntary” exchanges. Hence,
an attempt by Greece to formally subordinate its old bonds to new bonds
would most likely run into resistance from the European Union partners
backing its rescue package.
Technique Two: Relative Difficulties of Restructuring
This technique – which as best as we can tell, would not trigger CDS contracts
– is effectively a reverse engineered Exit Exchange offer. It will help, therefore, to
first describe the Exit Exchange technique, which was originally devised as a means
of deterring holdout creditors.10 (see Buchheit and Gulati, 2000).
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The Exit Exchange technique was devised to tackle the difficulty created by
the fact that sovereign bonds governed by New York law, prior to 2003, typically
required unanimous approval from the bondholders before any reduction in payment
terms on the bonds as a whole could occur. Alterations of non-payment terms,
however, could occur with something between a 50 percent and 66.67 percent vote
typically. The Exit Exchange technique took advantage of this latter characteristic of
the bonds. Once the approval of a large enough fraction of the bondholders to the
proposed exchange was achieved, these holders would be given new bonds (with the
agreed upon haircut) and in exchange, while handing in their old bonds, the old holder
would agree to eliminate key contractual protections from the bonds that remained
untendered (that is, the holdouts). So, the holdouts could find themselves holding
bonds with no negative pledge, pari passu, cross default, and acceleration provisions.
They could also find their bonds delisted and governed by the law of some
jurisdiction that would be unsympathetic to holdouts (e.g., the sovereign’s own
courts). The unattractiveness of being left holding the bag, so to speak, was enough to
induce dramatically high participation rates in at least three exchanges that were done
using this technique in Ecuador (2000), Uruguay (2003) and the Dominican Republic
(2005).
At bottom, the key to the success of the Exit Exchange technique is that no
bondholder wants to be left holding a contract that has significantly worse contract
rights than the others. This is because, in the event of another financial crisis, it is the
bonds with the weaker contract provisions that will both suffer first and the most.
If the Exit Exchange technique were used with Greek government bonds (for
example, with its small subset of English and Swiss law bonds), it would likely trigger
the CDS contracts because the use of the Exit Consent technique would be viewed as
inducing an involuntary exchange. However, the large majority of Greece’s current
bonds already have extremely weak contract provisions (no cross default, negative
pledge, or pari passu) and are governed by the law of a jurisdiction likely to be
sympathetic to the debtor and unsympathetic to holdouts. In other words, there is no
need to conduct exchange offer with the exchanging bondholders vote to worsen the
contract protections of their brethren (and that is the arguably coercive and ugly part
of an Exit Exchange offer). In the Greek case, all that needs to be done is for the
bondholders in the exchange to be given better terms. If the exchanging bondholders
are given new contracts that provide the comforting warmth of strong contract
protections – modification terms with high vote thresholds (maybe an 85 percent
requirement to alter payment terms in the future11), cross defaults, negative pledge
clauses, pari passu provisions, foreign law, etc. – then that will make it perilous to
remain out in the cold with a contract that provides no protection. And the larger the
number of bonds that move into the world of hard-to-restructure contracts, the greater
the peril the holders of easy-to-restructure bonds will be in when and if Greece returns
to financial distress. Any bondholder doubting this reality has only to look back at the
Brady restructurings of the 1980s where the sovereign bonds, especially those
governed by New York law, were largely left untouched because of how difficult it
11
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would have been to restructure them relative to the syndicated loans that constituted
the majority of the sovereign debt then. In other words, while bonds were not legally
senior, they were treated as de facto senior.12
Complications:
For the foregoing to work, the holders of the current contract-lite Greek bonds
have to fear that that there is a real likelihood that Greece might return to
financial distress in the near future. As things stand, this scenario has some
plausibility. The current deal gets Greece to only a debt to GDP ratio of 120
percent, excluding the impact of collateral enhancements that might be given
to these creditors or additions to the debt stock triggered by the need to
recapitalise local banks.
Further, holders of the current bonds have to believe that the next time around,
the debt restructurers will not be constrained by instructions such as the
exchange needs to be voluntary. The pronouncements of the Eurogroup on
November 28, 2010, when it was announced at all Eurozone sovereign bonds
issued after June 2013 would contain CACs, arguably push in this direction.
The recent EU summit on December 9, 2011 affirmed both that the Greek debt
problem and the modalities to resolve it are viewed as “unique and
exceptional” in Europe, and that CACs will be included in the terms and
conditions of all new euro government bonds.
Finally, the technique may not be sufficient to incentivize the roughly 7
percent of Greek bondholders who already own English-law and Swiss-law
bonds with all of necessary contract protections. Other than (possibly) a
higher voting threshold, the exchange would give them only what they already
have. The fact that these holders cannot easily be pushed into the exchange,
however, should remind the holders of domestic law bonds of the value of
having bonds with strong contract protections.

Would it Work? A Back-of-the-Envelope Calculation
The final question that we seek to address is whether the incentive offered by
making the new debt either legally or de-facto senior would be sufficiently strong to
convince creditors to accept new debt instruments along the lines described in the
October 26th Euro summit communiqué. This requires an estimate of what these
instruments would be worth to investors in net present value terms compared to the
old instruments that they would be tendering. Doing so is complicated by the fact that
negotiations between Greece and creditor representatives have so far been
inconclusive, so that no actual exchange offer has been published yet. However, we
know that the Euro summit stipulated “a nominal discount of 50 percent on notional
Greek debt held by private investors” and also set aside an official Eurozone
contribution of EUR 30 bn, presumably to finance either a cash “sweetener” or the
collateralisation of principal. Since the total volume of privately held Greek bonds is
12
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in the order of EUR 200 bn, this implies that the bond offer is likely to contain either
15 cents on the Euro in cash payouts, or alternatively collateralised principal worth 15
cents on the Euro in net present value terms.
For illustrative purposes, we focus on one specific proposal that was discussed
between Greece and its creditors which meets these conditions, namely, a 20 year, 35
percent amortizing discount bond with 10 years grace on principal, coupon of 5.6 of
new principal, and an upfront cash payment of 15 percent of old principal. The sum of
the cash payment and the face value of the new bond add up to 50 percent of the face
value of the old bond, as required by the Eurozone summit. The question is what this
bond would be worth to bondholders, on average, in net present value terms, and what
the implicit net present value “haircut” is, defined as the percentage difference
between new and old bonds, evaluated at a common discount rate.13
Table 2 contains the answer for three discount rate assumptions: 5 percent,
which may be thought of as close to Greece’s typical medium term borrowing rate in
normal times (assuming a future German Bund rate of about 3 percent, this
corresponds to a spread of about 200 basis points); 9 percent (corresponding to the
highest spreads suffered by Italy and Spain in the second half of 2011), and 13
percent, which can be taken as representing the yield after a debt exchange that falls
short of fully restoring fiscal credibility. The first line of the table shows the present
value of the assumed new bonds using these discount rates uniformly for all
payments. The second shows the “haircut” in the definition typically used by market
practitioners, namely, 100 (the face value of the old bond) minus the present value of
the new bond. Finally, the last line shows the net present value loss that the average
bondholder would suffer by accepting the debt exchange, using the same discount rate
to discount the old debt as is used to discount the new debt.14
Table 2. "Haircuts" Implicit in October 26, 2011 Debt
Restructuring Parameters for Greece: Illustrative Example 1/
(in percent)

Assumed discount rate
5
9
13
52.2
40.4
33.3
47.8
59.6
66.7
48.0
52.2
54.6

Value of new bonds
"Market" haircut
NPV haircut

1/ Assumed terms for new bond: 20 year 35% amortizing discount bond with 10
years grace on principal, coupon of 5.6% of new principal, and an upfront cash
payment of 15% of old principal. Calculations assume that all Greek government
bonds coming due after January 1, 2012 are tendered. Net present values
computed on the basis of tendering on January 1, 2012.

13

For a discussion of alternative approaches to computing “haircuts”, see Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer, supra note 2; and Jeromin Zettelmeyer How to do a Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the
Eurozone: Lessons from Emerging Market Debt Crises, in Guntram Wolff & William Cline (eds.),
RESOLVING THE EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS (2012).
14
The fact that this “net present value” haircut is somewhat lower than the haircut in the definition of
market practitioners is standard; this reflects the fact that the face value of the old bonds which is used
in the computation of the latter is higher than their present value. See Zettelmeyer, supra note 13.
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The bottom line is that the 50 percent face value discount that the EU leaders
committed to on the October 26th summit is likely to translate into an average NPV
haircut in about the same range, based on a plausible example of what the bond offer
might look like, and a range of discount rate assumptions. Hence, for the purpose of
the back-of-the-envelope calculation that follows, we treat face value and present
value haircuts to be the same, i.e. we ignore any discounting for the purposes of this
calculation.
In line with Figure 2, we assume that there are two relevant states: one in
which following the completion of the current exchange there is no further default or
restructuring, assumed to happen with probability π, and one in which there is such a
restructuring. If there is a new restructuring, it is assumed to happen fairly soon after
the current debt exchange, so that any coupon payments to holders of both new or old
bondholders between the time of the exchange and the new restructuring can be
ignored.15 In this case, bondholders face a simple trade-off:




If they opt for the new bonds, they will receive a cash payout of 15 cents on
one Euro of old principal immediately, and 35 cents later with probability π.
With probability (1-π), i.e. in the event of a new restructuring, they will
receive a recovery value of vNR ≤ 35.
If they hold on to their old bonds, they will receive full repayment of 100 cents
on the Euro with probability π, and a recovery value of vO ≤ 100 if there is a
new restructuring.

As discussed before, the voluntariness of the exchange is expressed in the fact
that the probability of receiving something less than the contractually promised terms,
π, is the same regardless of whether bondholders chose to accept the exchange offer
or not. However, the recovery values of the new bonds and the old ones in the event
of a future restructuring may be different.
Absent any other incentive, a risk-neutral individual bondholder should opt for
participation if:
15 + π*35 + (1- π)vNR ≥ π*100 + (1- π)vO
which can be rewritten as a condition on the probability that there will be no further
restructuring, π:
π ≤ [15 + vNR - vO]/ [65 + vNR - vO]

15

If one assumes a longer intervening period, one would need to take into account that because of the
principal reduction, coupon payments on the new debt are only about 40 percent (in absolute terms) of
coupon payments on the old debt. An easy way of taking this into account in the back-of-the-envelope
calculation is to express the cash payout received by the new bondholders net of this difference. For
example, if there is one coupon payment in the intervening period, the holder of the new bond would
receive 15 + 5.6*0.35 prior to the second restructuring, while she would have receive about 4.5 (the
average coupon on the old debt) if she had hold on to the old bonds. The difference is 12.4. For a twoyear intervening period, the difference would be about 9.8, and so on.
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This formula states that to generate an incentive for small bondholders to
accept the exchange, the probability π that there will be no future restructuring must
not be higher than a particular threshold, which depends on the difference between the
expected recovery values of the new and old bonds. The larger this difference, the
higher the threshold probability can be.
To obtain an intuition for what this means in practice, it is useful to consider
some special cases:
First, consider the case in which the expected recovery values of the new and
old bonds are the same (this could be achieved, for example, through a law that says
that in the event of a new restructuring, the face value of the remaining old bonds is
written down first to that of the new bonds, before being serviced equally). In that
case, π ≤ 15 / 65 = 0.23. This is perhaps an implausibly low probability of avoiding a
new restructuring. Hence, merely promising to treat the old and then new debt the
same in the event of a future debt restructuring is unlikely to be enough to ensure high
participation.
Second, we seek to establish the maximum value of π that would still avoid of
free riding. This is obtained by setting vNR = 35 and vO = 0. Hence, πmax = 50/100 =
0.50. This means that by setting vO sufficiently low relative to vNR, the exchange will
succeed (in the sense of avoiding the free rider problem) as long as investors view the
likelihood of a further restructuring to be at least 50 percent.
Finally, consider an intermediate case. Pessimistic market observers have
argued that the haircut suffered by private investors would need to be far higher, in
the order of 80 percent, to restore Greece to solvency. Assuming some holdouts, 80
percent is hence a plausible assumption for the maximum haircut that investors expect
on the new debt in the event that a new restructuring is needed. Hence vNR ≥ 20.
Suppose now that the old debt is strictly subordinated to the new debt (legally or de
facto) in a new restructuring. Since the new debt would not be repaid in full in the
event of a new restructuring, this means vO = 0. Using the minimum recovery value of
vNR = 20 for the participating bondholders implies p ≤ 35 / 85 = 0.41 – not an
unreasonable level, given the political and economic uncertainty prevailing in Greece
and Europe at the moment. Importantly, this level could be higher if investors are risk
averse, since risk averse investors will particularly value the fact that acceptance of
the exchange offer implies a “bird in hand” (15 cents on the dollar of cash right away,
plus 35 if they are lucky) rather than “two birds in the bush” (100 cents on the dollar
if they are lucky).
The back-of-the-envelope calculations above are for the average bondholder.
Short term bondholders (on a residual maturity basis) will face higher haircuts – in the
order of 67 percent – but as already argued, they will in any case have no incentive to
tender if the success in the exchange rules out an involuntary restructuring for about
one year. Note also that the calculations above assume that the bondholder that needs
to be persuaded to join the exchange does not enjoy CDS protection. For a CDSprotected creditor, vO = 100, since the creditor will collect full repayment in the event
of an involuntary restructuring. Hence, rejecting the debt exchange offer is a dominant
strategy: regardless of whether or not a further restructuring materialises, the investor
expects to be repaid in full. However, the volume of CDS protection written for
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Greece is limited (with reportedly about EUR 4bn of net exposure), and the horizon of
some of this protection is likely to be short, as very little new protection is likely to
have been written in the last two years.
Hence, under the assumptions made, perhaps up to EUR40 bn of debt would
still not be tendered. Hence, “success” in this exchange means a participation rate of
80 percent (EUR 160 bn out of the targeted 200) or higher.

Conclusion
The notion of a voluntary debt exchange with a 50 percent haircut seems
oxymoronic. Why would investors – or at least small investors, that individually have
no impact on the success of the exchange – voluntarily accept a 50 percent writedown of their claims?
This paper has shown that in the special circumstances of Greece, there may
nonetheless be a way of designing debt exchange offer that meets these seemingly
contradictory objectives. This possibility arises due to three facts, which jointly make
the Greek case fairly unique.
First, under the terms of the debt restructuring envisaged in the October 26,
2011 EU Summit declaration, Greek debt might become manageable, but would
remain high, at 120 percent of GDP. As a result, there is a possibility that Greece may
be faced with future debt distress even if it achieves a 50 percent haircut with large
creditor participation. Such a situation is very likely to result in an involuntary
restructuring. The reason for this is that – as private sector debt is gradually repaid
and replaced with IMF-EU debt – the private sector haircut required to restore Greece
to solvency would no longer be achievable using a voluntary approach.
Second, although some of the outstanding Greek debt will come due in 2012,
most will not. Hence, in the event that a second restructuring is required in 2013 to
restore Greece to solvency, most of the holders of current Greek debt would be “hit”.
The same would be true (with less force) if a new restructuring were to happen in
2014. When deciding whether or not to tender their debt in the voluntary exchange
that is currently envisaged, most investors hence need to worry not just about the
haircut associated with that exchange, but also about how they might fare in the event
of a new restructuring.
Third, most outstanding Greek government bonds are domestic law bonds that
offer minimal creditor protections: no pari passu clause, no negative pledge clause, no
cross-default clause. The implication of this is that in the event of an involuntary
restructuring they would offer minimal creditor protection.
The implication of these three facts is both that it is easy to design new Greek
bonds that do much better in protecting the creditor in the event of a Greek default
than most of the currently outstanding instruments, and that Greek bond holders
should take this extra protection seriously. In the presence of bonds that are much
harder to restructure – because they are issued under foreign jurisdiction and expose
the sovereign to litigation in the even of an involuntary restructuring – the holders of
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current Greek government bonds may well bear the brunt of a future restructuring.
Even if they are not subordinated de jure, they may find themselves subordinated de
facto.
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that avoiding this risk, together with
a 15 percent cash payout (or equivalently, collateralisation of principal in the same
amount) offered to accepting creditors, may generate sufficiently strong incentive to
make creditors accept a 50 percent debt exchange offer – provided that the risk of a
new restructuring is viewed as sufficiently high, in the order of at least 50 percent.
Hence, the answer to the question of why creditors might be willing to
voluntarily accept a 50 percent haircut is: “Because in a situation of high uncertainty
and continued sovereign risk, switching into new bonds that give investors 15 cents
on the Euro in cash and at the same time put them in a better position to recover value
in a default might be more attractive than holding on to the current debt.”
Ironically, it is the lack of faith of the market that a reduction of the Greek
public debt ratio to 120 percent is enough to make Greece’s debt sustainable that may
help to make Greece’s latest plan work. If offered new bonds with stronger creditor
protections and a cash payout, this lack of faith may lead to high creditor participation
even in a voluntary bond exchange involving a high haircut. After that exchange,
Greece will still face an uphill battle if it wants to avoid a further restructuring. But
contrary to a situation when creditor participation in the initial exchange is low, it is a
battle that it might win.
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